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Abstract: 
This contribution reviews some economic governance aspects of the EU’s 1995 enlargement. The focus is on 
selected fields of internal market pertinence in Austria compared with Finland and Sweden. The analysis starts 
with an overview of Austria’s initial position and reviews the instruments of EU economic governance at the 
time, including fiscal rules and instruments. The central part of the paper is devoted to the adjustments 
required to comply with the gradual completion and refinement of the internal market. Special attention is 
given to competition policy and public procurement. Overall, economic governance in Austria was significantly 
“modernised” in the course of approaching and implementing EU membership. Although this contributed to a 
sustained improvement in competitiveness, Austria was in many respects lagging behind the comparative 
performances of Finland and Sweden. 
JEL codes:  F15, H11, H60, K21, K23, L16 
Key words: economic and fiscal governance, internal market, competition policy, public procurement, network 
industries, competitiveness 
1. Introduction 
25 years ago, when the Fourth Enlargement was to form the EU15, the three accession countries Austria, 
Finland and Sweden were already part of the free trade area between EFTA und the EC (established in 1973), of 
the Single Market as an element of the European Economic Area (since 1994), and, given the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992/93, of the evolving monetary union. Austria and Finland subsequently introduced the common 
currency, while Sweden until now has obviated such a step.  
The following remarks will concentrate on the consequences for economic policy governance in the countries 
of the Fourth Enlargement. Norway and Germany will sporadically be covered as reference countries. The next 
section is devoted to the initial position of the accession countries1 with special emphasis on the structural 
characteristics of the Austrian economy just before entering the EU. Section 3 covers the economic and fiscal 
governance of the EU at the time of the Fourth Enlargement and the developments thereafter. Drawing on 
Austrian experiences in selected areas, Section 4 asserts that EU membership was expected to effectuate, and 
it actually entailed, a swift implementation of the internal market rules. The final Section 5 summarises these 
aspects under the heading of competitiveness. 
2. Diverging conditions in the candidate countries 
In the decade before joining the EU, the countries concerned showed quite differing economic developments. 
In terms of the real growth of GDP, the three accession countries experienced a steady increase in growth rates 
during the 1980s. In the first half of the 1990s, political turbulences and the trough of the European business 
cycle were mirrored in low growth and even in recession. Finland was severely hurt by the dissolution of the 
USSR in 1991 and the ensuing collapse of bilateral trade between Finland and Russia, followed by a stunning 
recovery. In Sweden, the banking crisis of 1991/93 resulted in a backlash, followed by a dynamic recovery. In 
Austria, economic development was only mildly hurt by these events, but after accession growth remained 
more hesitant than in the other two countries. Norway was anyway a special case because of the oil and gas 
exploration and extraction activities, and a production structure lopsided towards shipyards and fishery 
(Handler 1976). Since then, and until the onset of the financial crisis, GDP growth exhibited the ups and downs 
of regular business cycles, partly disturbed by early liberalisation efforts and the ups and downs of international 
prices of crude oil (Figure 1). 
 
 




Figure 1: Real GDP growth rates in percent, 3-year averages 
Source: AMECO 
 
In Austria, accession to the EU was preceded by 
 a long history of discussions, starting already in the 1960s, as to the political possibility of joining the EU 
(given the Peace Treaty of 1955, obliging Austria to refrain from any association with Germany, and the 
following constitutional law to remain a permanently neutral country); 
 fierce public debates as to the economic feasibility of EU membership (weighing the pros and cons); and 
 a series of policy decisions to make the Austrian economy compatible and competitive with conditions 
in the EEA and the EU. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Austria availed of a solid structural basis for joining the EU, chiefly characterised 
by a functioning social partnership and the experiences from the hard currency policy. Still, a number of 
weaknesses remained, as repeatedly assessed by consultation missions from the IMF and the OECD as well as 
by national witnesses:2 
 a large sector of nationalised industries with limited exposure to competition; 
 low productivity in the heavily regulated services sector; 
 meagre efforts to liberalise the financial markets, with setbacks such as the “Ordnungspolitische 
Vereinbarungen” of 1985 (reducing competition between banks and resulting in an overbanked 
economy); 
 higher inflation in Austria than in Germany (in spite of pegging the schilling to the deutschmark); and 
 deficiencies in the structure of industry, leading to a rather weak export performance. 
In January 1987, the newly-formed Federal Government stated in its inaugural declaration that “the 
narrowness of the Austrian domestic market is one of the main obstacles to Austria’s economic development” 
and therefore “participation in the further development of the European integration process is of central 
importance to Austria” (see Legtmann 1989). At this stage, Austria followed a threefold approach to 
integration: multilateral efforts via EFTA, bilateral initiatives with the EC in specific areas (free movement of 
labour, freedom of establishments, financial services), and autonomous measures to harmonise Austrian 
legislation with EC law. The overarching goal was to achieve a level playing field with other countries of the 
emerging internal market, either with or without EU membership. 
However, membership was seen to round off previous integration steps such as the free trade agreement 
between EFTA and EEC and the Treaty on the EEA, including the internal market for members. One of the major 
arguments in favour of Austria joining the EU was the chance to participate in the wider policy making system 
and to “internationalize” the rather inward-oriented sectors of the Austrian economy (chiefly services, 
 











































































agriculture and the public sector). This would extort long-overdue structural improvements and, in the medium 
term, would strengthen the competitive position of Austrian firms on world markets.  
Stemming the original opposition from small business and agriculture, the social partners joined forces and 
endorsed the government’s accession strategy, supporting the “cost pressure model”, already applied earlier 
by the hard currency policy: More competition would increase productivity of firms which in turn would be 
compensated by lower inflation, so that real incomes would be sustained and competitiveness improved. The 
economic challenges of membership seemed manageable, but were amplified when in late 1995 the federal 
government was dissolved and parliamentary elections were called. Some of the planned liberalisation 
measures had to be postponed, especially in the telecommunication and postal sector. The natural gas market 
was already quite open, while liberalisation in the electricity sector was partly guided by environmental 
concerns to further hydroelectricity and keep off electricity generated by nuclear power plants. 
3. Backlogs in economic and fiscal governance 
Before the financial crisis, a recurring criticism of the EU’s economic governance system was the dominating 
focus on short-term fiscal and medium-term competitiveness targets, thereby losing sight of the long-term 
vision of improving the well-being of the peoples, as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU). This changed as the euro-crisis called for decisive action with immediate 
effect, also allowing for medium to long-term goals such as social justice and sustainable development. In 2010, 
the long-term growth strategy was laid down in the “Europe 2020” programme for employment, education, 
innovation, climate and the fight against poverty. The major coordinating instrument was the European 
Semester, guiding the economic policy cycle of Member States during the calendar year. On the short end it 
includes the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and the accompanying scoreboard, aiming to identify 
and counter early on any macroeconomic risks and imbalances. 
In the second half of 1998, when Austria for the first time held the European Presidency, an impulse was given 
to establish a consultative forum among representatives from the Commission, the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Central Bank, national governments, and the European social partners: the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue (MED). It was formally established at the European Council of Cologne in June 1999 
as a biannual event for the joint discussion of monetary, fiscal, and incomes policies. In a reformed version, the 
MED still exists, and a complement for the Eurozone is in discussion (Koll 2020).  
A more modest success has so far gained the recommendation of the Council of the European Union (Council, 
2016) to establish a National Productivity Board (NPB) in each country of the euro area, other EU countries 
being invited to join in. As independent institutions, NPBs are supposed to engage in high quality economic and 
statistical analysis with results open to the public domain. In its progress report, the European Commission 
(2019b) complained that advances have been slow and uneven across Member States. In the meantime, NPBs 
are existent in 14 euro area countries and 3 non-euro area Member States, although neither in Austria nor in 
Finland and Sweden.3 Sweden has actually decided not to participate in the exercise, while in Austria the 
reasoned concept of entrusting the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) at least with a coordinating 
function (as noted, e.g., in Lacuesta and Tello, 2016) has not been affirmatively answered by the relevant 
authorities. 
In contrast to economic governance, the principles of the EU’s fiscal governance were already well established 
around the mid-1990s. Compliance with the rules, though, differed markedly from country to country. While 
Austria was well prepared in terms of monetary policy, the fiscal deficit was running out of line in the early 
1990s, culminating at some 6% of GDP in 1995. The main reason was a gracious social policy in 1992-93 and a 
tax reduction package in 1994. After the collapse of government in late 1995, the eventual consolidation 
happened in 1996-97, bringing the deficit back to the Maastricht range of less than 3% of GDP. Even more 
disturbing were the developments in Finland and Sweden, where net lending in percent of GDP gyrated 
between plus 4 to 6 percent in the late 1980s and minus 8 to 10 percent in 1993 (Figure 2), returning to high 
positive values by the end of the 1990s.  
 
 
3 See European Commission, National Productivity Boards. https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-




Figure 2: General government net lending as percent of GDP, 1980-2019 
 
Source: AMECO and World Bank 
 
When Austria prepared for joining the Eurozone, public debt was just increasing beyond the Maastricht limit of 
60% of GDP. That threshold has never been reached since. The debt ratio remained quite stable before the 
financial crisis but surged up thereafter, culminating in 2015 at almost 85% of GDP. The downturn since has 
now been stopped by the fiscal and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 3). 
 




By comparison, the Finnish debt ratio was just in the tens before the breakdown of the Soviet Union, it surged 
dramatically upwards thereafter but remained just below 60% of GDP. In the first phase of Finnish EU 
membership, the debt ratio declined (to less than 33% in 2008), but almost doubled in the following period 
until 2015 and 2016, when the ratio slightly surpassed the benchmark. The Swedish debt ratio, not being bound 
by euro rules, meandered around the Austrian ratio in the years before EU membership, hitting a high value of 
almost 70%. In the years preceding the financial crisis, it experienced a similar decline as the Finnish ratio, but 
remained stable thereafter and in 2019 amounted to less than 35%. All three countries are now confronted 
with the fiscal and economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis, Austria starting from a relatively 
uncomfortable debt position with many years to come devoid of meeting the Maastricht criterion. 
When the international financial crisis developed into a fiscal crisis, the focus turned to the possible 
surveillance role of independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) which the European Commission sees as “non-partisan 






















































































































Sweden established the Fiscal Policy Council in 2007, Finland the National Audit Office in 2013, and Austria the 
Fiscal Advisory Council also in 2013 (replacing a forerunner that was in place since 1970). Beetsma and Debrun 
(2016) have shown that the existence of a national fiscal council contributes to the quality of fiscal policy by 
taming the deficit bias of well-intended governments. 
4. The internal market as productivity boost for Austria 
Although the internal market was declared complete in 1992, the years thereafter were laden with lagging 
compliances but also with further improvements of the system. To keep pressure on Member States to 
implement the internal market legislation, the European Council of Amsterdam in 1997 established the Single 
Market Action Plan. National advances of countries and their relative performance were publicised by the 
Single Market Scoreboard. The Austrian Presidency in the second half of 1998 was keen to take up open 
internal market issues, such as “better regulation” (Handler 1998), and long-term aspects of competitiveness 
(Darlap and Handler 1998). Austria also proposed to drastically reduce the number of Councils to just a Macro-
Council and a Micro-Council but failed to get a majority of Member States on board. Already in 1997, Austria 
had started to liberalise shop-opening hours (Burger 1998), moving ahead jointly with Finland, and both 
following the lead by Sweden where deregulation had occurred already in 1978. 
The Single Market Scoreboard (SMS) measures the national transposition deficits as the percentage of Single 
Market Directives not yet notified to the Commission in relation to the total number of Directives that should 
have been notified by a specific deadline. When the SMS was first published in November 1997, Austria (with a 
deficit of 10.1%, largely the result of delays in transposing agricultural legislation) attained the worst position of 
all EU15 countries, closely followed by Germany and Belgium. Finland (4.3%) was among the most advanced 
countries, Sweden (6.2%) somewhere in the middle range. Five years later, all new members had achieved 
significant progress with Sweden (0,4%) scoring best among all EU countries. Since the late 2000s, the 
transposition deficit of Austria has generally been somewhat above EU average. Sweden’s deficit has mostly 
stayed below average, while Finland’s deficit has grossly moved in line with the EU average. Latest figures for 
December 2018 show deficits for Austria, Finland and Sweden of 1.2%, 0.5% and 0.1%. 
In case a Member State does not apply Single Market rules correctly or fails to transpose an EU Directive timely 
and correctly into national law, the Commission may initiate an infringement proceeding. In the last fifteen 
years or so, the number of new infringement cases against Austria has consistently been higher than in Finland 
and mostly also higher than in Sweden (Figure 4). This is also mirrored in the number of infringement cases 
pending. In December 2018, Austria was subject to 66 cases pending, of which 34 were late transposition cases 
and 22 cases of incorrect transposition. The figures for Sweden were 48, 26 and 17, for Finland 32, 22 and 6. 
Wolfmayr et al. (2019) compare various indicators for the compliance with Single Market legislation and 
conclude that the transposition of EU Directives to national law is fairly advanced, while the potential of 
reducing infringement proceedings and increasing the number of solved cross-border disagreements is still 
large.  
 
Figure 4: Number of new infringement cases  
 
























Rewriting the basic understanding of competition policy 
The start of the EEA in 1994 also marked the application of EC competition law in the accession countries. 
Competition policy itself was in a stage of transformation, characterised by a gradual shift from the orthodox 
legal approach to the “more economics-based” approach which weighed legal principles against economic 
efficiency (Hildebrand 1998). It anyway required an adjustment of Austrian legislation, although many of the 
existing rules were not in stark contrast to EU law and could therefore remain unchanged. However, the basic 
understanding of competition policy had to be reshaped fundamentally. The old Cartel Act (Kartellgesetz) had 
provided for a strong realm of the social partners who could bring cases to the Cartel Court and who were also 
involved in nominating laymen judges. This system was known to create conflicts of interest, making the 
system vulnerable to pressures from special interest groups (OECD 2001). A weird result was the evolvement of 
market concentration in various areas, most prominently in the media sector and in food retailing, as the Cartel 
Court did not prevent mergers that resulted in severe market dominance (Böheim 2002). 
A formidable improvement was accomplished in 2002, when the reform of the Austrian competition law 
entailed the creation of the independent Federal Competition Authority (Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde) with 
broad investigative power (on background considerations, see Barfuß 2001). Alongside the Authority, the 
Federal Cartel Prosecutor (Bundeskartellanwalt) was established as an official arm of the Federal Minister of 
Justice. Both bodies can now bring cases to the Cartel Court where the influence of the laymen judges was 
reduced. The social partners have retained some consultative influence, though, via the newly established 
Competition Commission. The central deficiency of the Austrian Competition Authority was for many years the 
insufficient number and quality of professional staff. This has partly been corrected in 2017 and the years since. 
2017 also brought an update of competition rules including the legal possibility to act as a whistle-blower. 
Deficits in the implementation of public procurement rules 
In industrial countries, the share of goods and services procured by public authorities absorbs about one 
quarter to one third of general government expenditures. According to OECD data for 2017, general 
government procurement spending in percent of GDP accounted in Austria for 13.2%, in Sweden for 16.2% and 
in Finland for 17.8%. Compared with 1995, these shares declined in Austria and Sweden but remained fairly 
stable in Finland (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: General government procurement spending, in percent of GDP 
Country % of GDP % of general 
government 
expenditure 
1995 2000 2007 2010 2015 2017 2007 2017 
Austria 18.4 17.1 12.4 13.7 13.5 13.2 25.2 26.9 
Finland 16.3 15.4 14.4 17.2 17.5 17.8 30.8 32.9 
Sweden 22.1 19.4 14.5 16.1 16.0 16.2 29.3 32.8 
Norway   11.2 12.6 13.9 14.6 27.0 29.2 
Switzerland   7.7 8.3 8.8 9.1 25.2 26.6 
Germany 18.0 17.0 12.9 14.8 15.1 15.5 30.2 35.3 
EU15 17.3 16.0       
OECD   11.8 13.1 11.9 12.2 30.2 29.1 
Source: OECD, Government at a Glance, various issues. 
 
Of much less importance is cross-border procurement within the EU with just 1.5% of all public contracts 
awarded, which suggests “that the full benefits of cross-border trade and competition are not being fully 
reaped” (European Commission 2010). Part of the explanation may be found in the tenacious implementation 
of EU Directives, as already demurred in the White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (European 
Commission 1985, para.81-87). At that time, important fields of production – energy, transport, water and (in 
the case of supply contracts) telecommunications – were not even covered by the Directives.  
The regional distribution of direct public procurement contracts with bidders from other countries differs 
substantially according to the respective neighbourhoods. Between 2009 and 2015, Austria allotted 64% of all 
contracts to German and 8% to Italian suppliers. In Finland, 29% went to Swedish and 9% to German bidders. In 




With its public procurement legislation, the EU “seeks to create an open and competitive pan-European 
procurement market” which “can be an important source of support for innovation, environmental protection 
and employment” (European Commission 2010). The “2014 Directives” have broadened the view from the 
dominant orientation on competition and efficiency to a broader view that has been termed “strategic 
procurement” (Handler 2015). Instead of focusing on the lowest price, tenders under the new regime are 
evaluated to potentially include issues of environmental sustainability, social policy, innovation, education, and 
public health. According to the Public Procurement section of the SMS for 2018, the accession countries of 
1995 and Norway were all facing various deficits in the implementation of common procurement rules, Austria 
being on the low side (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Single Market Scoreboard: Public Procurement in 2018 
 Austria Finland Sweden Norway 
Single bidders     
No calls for bids     
Publication rate     
Cooperative procurement     
Award criteria     
Decision speed     
SME contractors     
SME bids     
Procedures divided into slots     
 
                       satisfactory                       average                            unsatisfactory                        n/a 
Source: Based on European Commission (2019c). The colours are based on qualitative policy judgment on what 
constitutes good practice. 
 
Major deficiencies in Austria stem from a low publication rate in the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), lack of 
procurement with more than one public buyer (cooperative procurement), only few SME contractors and 
unsatisfactory division of procurement procedures into slots, indicating that mostly large companies are suited 
to bid. When approximated by the average number of bids per procurement in the period 2006-2010, Austria 
(5.2 bids) ranked below Sweden (5.6) and Finland (5.7) – for comparison, the figure for Germany was 7.6 bids. 
With respect to procurement procedures (open, restricted, negotiated, competitive dialogue), Austria stood 
out with a comparatively high share of negotiated contracts with TED publication. In a comparison with other 
EU countries, Strand et al. (2011) moaned about the low degree of competition in Austrian public procurement. 
Liberalization of network industries: Austria late and expensive 
The network industries (telecommunications, electricity, transport) were long regarded as “natural 
monopolies” subject to state regulation, if not state ownership. EU legislation has attempted to unhinge from 
vertically integrated networks those parts that can be ceded to the market, and to create independent 
regulators for the non-competitive parts.  
When the “Northern Enlargement” became effective, the liberalisation of network industries was in Austria 
proceeding along the following timeline: 
 The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector was under way and was completed in 1998. 
 1999 marked the start of the stepwise unbundling of the electricity sector with effective completion 
by October 2001, much earlier than required by EU Directives (OECD 2001). Also, the natural gas 
market was liberalised earlier than the required deadline in autumn 2002. 
 Only in 2001 started the liberalisation of the railway system, also delayed was the opening of postal 
services. 
 Independent regulatory authorities were introduced in 1999 for railways; in 2001 for 
telecommunications and electricity, in 2002 for natural gas and financial services.  
In all competitive sectors analysed by Gönenç et al. (2001), Austria was less open in 1998 than Finland and 
Sweden. This holds for mobile telephony, air passenger transport, road freight, and especially retail 





In the energy sector, liberalisation efforts in Austria were rather modest at the outset, permitting only large 
customers to freely choose their suppliers, without sufficient unbundling of production and transmission. 
National implementation of Directive 96/92/EC was accomplished in Finland already in 1997, in Sweden in 1998 
and in Austria not before 2001 (Steiner 2001). A few years later, the OECD (2005) criticised that „Although the 
electricity sector is completely liberalised in Austria there is still lack of competition. … All in all, it appears that 
intensity of competition is rather low and that mergers of the past have contributed to this situation.” 
The slow pace of harmonising the EU energy markets is visible in the widely diverging electricity price levels. On 
the low side were prices in the Nordic countries with open borders between them and low-cost hydroelectric 
production facilities, while in Austria, in spite of its abundant hydroelectricity, prices were mostly above EU 
average. For the period from early 1997 and mid-2002, the European Commission (2003) observed an 
improvement in the overall level of market opening in the electricity sector, while the prospects for 
competition in the gas market were significantly behind. Over the whole period, the EU experienced a 
sweeping drop in electricity prices and an increase in gas prices – also mirrored by price developments in the 
accession countries (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Development of energy retail prices between January 1997 and June 2002 (current prices, before taxes) 
 EU average Austria Finland Sweden 
1/1997 7/2002 1/1997 7/2002 1/1997 7/2002 1/1997 7/2002 
 Electricity consumption: € per MWh 
Large: 24 GWh/year 52 48 69 60* 37 37 37 26 
Medium: 50 MWh/year 108 92 163 97 60 57 70 36 
Small: 3.5 MWh/year 99 96 98 77 73 70 68 69 
 Gas consumption: € per GJ 
Large: 418 TJ/year (120 GWh/year) 3.6 4.4 3.8 4.8 3.6 4.4 -- 3.5 
Medium: 418 GJ/year (120 MWh/yr) 6.5 7.7 -- 8.1 -- -- 6.7 7.1 
Small: 16 GJ/year (4.5 MWh/year) 10.9 12.0 8.3 11.6 -- -- 9.9 11.6 
Source: European Commission (2003). *Latest available data: 1/1999. 
 
The deregulation of telecommunication services brought a significant drop in prices for telephone calls via 
fixed networks (Table 4). Between 1997 and 2003, the average price level of EU15 countries was slashed almost 
by half. Just Finland experienced a slight increase, though starting from a rather low level. In contrast, Sweden, 
with comparably low prices, reduced them further by 45.5%. Among the accession countries, Austria started 
from the most expensive position which it still held after a formidable reduction of 71.7% (Handler et al. 2004). 
 
Table 4: Prices for telephone calls via fixed networks, in € 
 1997 2003 Change 
Austria 4.36 1.23 -71.7% 
Finland 1.05 1.11 +5.7% 
Sweden 1.10 0.60 -45.5% 
EU15 average 2.74 1.39 -49.3% 
Source: Handler et al. (2004). Note: Prices are for 10 minutes local calls plus 10 minutes within-country long-distance calls. 
 
The deregulation of vertically integrated network industries is closely related to the issue of privatising state-
owned enterprises, although providing services of general economic interest (SGEI)4 is not primarily an issue of 
ownership, but is rather guided by the general targets of improving market conditions, fostering competition, 
and increasing efficiency (European Commission 2016). Within the EU, privatisation projects started in the late 
1980s and boomed in the second half of the 1990. The results were ambiguous, depending inter alia on the 
government level of ownership. Loeffler et al. (2012) concluded that “increased competition was only achieved 
in countries and sectors that had a state monopoly at the outset. On the other hand, when a number of 
regional or local monopolies existed, market concentration increased as larger companies bought up their 
smaller competitors.” 
 




The role of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in Austria goes back to Nazi times and the post-WWII attempts to 
stabilise and recoup the devastated and abandoned parts of industry. What in the immediate post-war period 
turned out to be a success-story, over time became a rather clumsy and inefficient corner of an otherwise 
internationalising and thriving production sector. Solutions to this problem were elaborated but 
implementation often failed due to ideological struggles among the social partners and their hassle with the 
government. Many incentives in favour of large-scale privatisation came from the repeated interventions by 
the IMF and OECD consultation missions and from the European Commission in course of evaluating the 
application for EU membership. 
Based on the number of employees in SOEs as a share in total employment, Austria cannot be considered a 
special case. According to OECD (2017), the 2015 share amounted in Austria to 1.9%, in Sweden to 2.7%, and in 
Finland to 3.1%. Just Norway was an outlier with 9.5%, which is due to the large oil exploring and extracting 
sector. More generally, Høj et al. (2007) found that in some countries (including Austria and Norway) there was 
considerable scope for further privatisation, though frequently not without friction. “In some cases, 
privatisation may be hindered by the need for parliamentarian consent (Norway), constitutional restrictions 
(Finland and Austria), or the legal requirement to maintain controlling stakes (France).” Other barriers to timely 
realising privatisation programmes may have been unfavourable stock market conditions and public ownership 
at lower levels of government, e.g. in the electricity sector (Austria, Finland, Germany, Norway) and the 
telecommunications sector (Finland). 
5. Converging competitiveness 
International competitiveness, a prime issue of economic policy already in normal times, emanated in Austria 
even more into the foreground when membership in the EU and the eurozone had become a reality. Using as 
indicator the real effective exchange rates (REERs), deflated by relative unit labour costs, Figure 5 provides a 
view of the developments in the three accession countries. For Austria, the REER increased during the 1980s 
indicating a relative loss of competitiveness. This was partly due to an appreciation of the schilling vis-à-vis the 
US dollar and the deutschmark, but also the result of increasing relative prices. During the political, economic 
and financial turbulences of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the REER first declined but resumed the upward 
trend until 1995. During the first decade of EU membership, Austrian competitiveness improved, to turn 
around again after the financial crisis, though not falling back to 1995 levels.  
 
Figure 5: Real effective exchange rates, 1980-2019 (1995 = 100) 
 
Source: AMECO 
Note: The real effective exchange rates are based on unit labour costs for the total economy and are calculated relative to 
EU15 countries. Double export weights are used, reflecting competition in the home markets of the various competitors as 
well as competition in export markets elsewhere. A rise in the index means a loss of competitiveness. 
 
The history is a bit different for the other two accession countries. Even more pronounced than Austria in the 











































































































of interest rates and capital movements in 1986, Finland experienced an overheating of the economy. This 
came abruptly to an end when the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991 and the Finnish export industry fell into 
crisis (Ahtiala and Junttila 2016). A markka devaluation terminated the peg to the ECU basket of currencies. In 
the wake of the ECU currency crisis of September 1992, the markka became a floating currency which it 
remained until being replaced by the euro in 1999. Since the mid-1990s, the Finnish REER developed more or 
less parallel to the Austrian index.  
In the late 1980s, Sweden had also experienced an economic boom with rising inflation rates. In the course of 
the currency turmoil in 1992, the krona left the peg to the ECU currencies, and has since been under a regime 
of managed floating. Although EU membership as a rule entails entering the eurozone, Sweden has not (yet) 
taken that step as public opinion indicates a possible negative outcome of an inevitable referendum. Since 
1995 the Swedish REER index has fluctuated around a slightly falling trend, also interrupted by the crisis in the 
global financial system. 
Figure 5 is indicative for the divergent preconditions of the three accession countries before joining the EU and 
for the overall impact of EU membership on them. Austria had comparatively favourable starting conditions in 
macroeconomic terms but was about to gain most in terms of market regulation and institutions. While 
monetary policy was perfectly on track for the introduction of the euro, fiscal policy was struggling to fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria. Many more adjustments were required to match the dynamic progress in the completion of 
the internal market and to make economic governance competitive. Austria was lagging behind Finland and 
Sweden in terms of transposing internal market directives, adequately staffing its independent competition 
authority, eliminating the deficit in public procurement rules, and introducing market elements in the network 
industries. 
However, when measured in terms of competitive advances, Austria has fared quite well. In 2019, all three 
accession countries had somewhat lower REER levels than in 1995 which means that, over time, 
competitiveness relative to the EU15 average has slightly improved and has also converged. This result is 
corroborated by the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum (WEF). In the last two 
decades, all three countries have consistently been among the world best 25 countries. In most years, Austria 
has trailed the others of the group, the overall top position has interchangeably been held by Finland or 
Sweden. 
Competitiveness has been discussed here as an issue of individual Member States, but it is also relevant for the 
position of the EU as a political entity in the context of global politics and economic relations. An important 
ingredient to competitiveness is the system of policy governance at EU and national levels, the focus of the 
current paper. In the Austrian case, the upgrading of public governance to the continuously ameliorating EU 
standards is by far not a finished task. It is, above all, subject to changing political priorities, as the euro-crisis 
showed, and as we currently experience with the COVID-19 crisis.  
References 
Ahtiala, Pekka, Juha Junttila (2016), The collapse of soviet trade and Finland’s Great Depression of the 1990’s: A 
re-examination. Junttila’s Lab: Finland's Depression of the 1990's, 17 February. 
Barfuß, Walter (2001), Zur Organisation der Wettbewerbsbehörden in Österreich. In: Fuchs und Horvath 
(Hrsg.): 242-251.  
Beetsma, Roel W.M.J., Xavier Debrun (2016), Fiscal Councils: Rationale and Effectiveness. IMF Working Paper 
WP/16/86, April. 
Böheim, Michael (2002), The Future of Austrian Competition Policy. In: Handler and Burger (eds.): 51-63. 
Breuss, Fritz, Heinz Handler, Jan Stankovsky (1988), Österreichische Optionen einer EG-Annäherung und ihre 
Folgen. Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, WIFO-Gutachten, Wien, Jänner.  
Burger, Christina (1998), Auswirkungen der Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten. Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten, Oktober. ISBN 3-901676-12-0. 
Butschek, Felix (2004), Vom Staatsvertrag zur EU: Österreichische Wirtschaftsgeschichte von 1955 bis zur 
Gegenwart. Wien (Böhlau-Verlag). 
Council (2016), Council Recommendation of 20 September 2016 on the establishment of National Productivity 
Boards. Official Journal of the European Union C 349/1, 24 September. 
Darlap, Patrick, and Heinz Handler, eds. (1998), Future Competitiveness of Europe. European Academy of 





European Commission (1985), Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the 
European Council, Milan, 28-29 June.  
European Commission (2003), Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity 
and gas market. Updated report incorporating candidate countries. SEK(2002) 1038. 
European Commission (2010), Towards a Single Market Act. For a highly competitive social market economy. 
50 proposals for improving our work, business and exchanges with one another. Communication from the 
Commission, COM(2010) 608 final/2, 11 November. 
European Commission (2016), State-Owned Enterprises in the EU: Lessons Learnt and Ways Forward in a Post-
Crisis Context. Institutional Paper 031, Luxembourg (Publications Office of the European Union). 
European Commission (2017), Measurement of impact of cross-border penetration in public procurement. 
Final report, February. 
European Commission (2019a), Monitoring the application of European Union law: 2018 Annual Report. Part I: 
General Statistical Overview, Brussels. 
European Commission (2019b), Progress report on the implementation of the Council Recommendation of 20 
September 2016 on the establishment of National Productivity Boards. Report from the Commission to the 
Council, COM(2019) 152 final, 27 February. 
European Commission (2019c), Single Market Scoreboard: Public Procurement. Reporting period 1/2018-
12/2018. 
Fuchs, Walter, Othmar Horvath, Hrsg. (2001), Wirtschaftsstandort Österreich: Von der Theorie zur Praxis – 
Festschrift Heinz Handler. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit. Wien, Jänner. ISBN 3-901 676-27-9. 
Gönenç, Rauf, Maria Maher and Giuseppe Nicoletti (2001), The implementation and the effects of regulatory 
reform: Past experience and current issues. OECD Economic Studies, No. 32: 11-98. 
Handler, Heinz (1976), Oil Revenues: Their Implications for an Industrial Economy. Finance & Development 
13(4), December: 16-20. 
Handler, Heinz (1989), Grundlagen der österreichischen Hartwährungspolitik: Geldwertstabilisierung, 
Phillipskurve, Unsicherheit. Wien (Manz-Verlag). 
Handler, Heinz, ed. (1998), Better Regulation Serves Employment. Austrian Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Conference held in Vienna, October. ISBN 3-901676-15-5. 
Handler, Heinz (2015), Strategic public procurement: An overview. Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
(WIFO), WWWforEurope Policy Paper, 28 November. 
Handler, Heinz, Michael Böheim, Martin Falk, and Ewald Walterskirchen (2004), Strukturreformen in Österreich 
aus der Sicht der Lissabon-Agenda. Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO), November. 
Handler, Heinz, and Christina Burger, eds. (2002), Competition and Competitiveness in a New Economy. 
Austrian Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour, Vienna, July. ISBN 3-901676-33-3. 
Hildebrand, Doris (1998), The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules. European Monographs 
17, The Hague, London, Boston (Kluwer Law International). ISBN 9041105964. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752900000112 
Høj, Jens, Miguel Jimenez, Maria Maher, Guiseppe Nicoletti and Mikael Wise (2007), Product Market 
Competition in the OECD Countries: Taking Stock and Moving Forward. OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper 575, ECO/WKP(2007)35, 17 September. 
Koll, Willi (2020), Zwanzig Jahre Makroökonomischer Dialog der EU: Neustart für den Euroraum und die 
Mitgliedstaaten. Wirtschaftsdienst 100(3), März: 177-184. 
Kramer, Helmut (1994), Austria in the European Union. Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), 
Monatsberichte, Sonderheft. 
Lacuesta, Tello (2016), National Productivity Boards. Banco de España, Economic Bulletin, November: 19-26. 
Legtmann, Hans (1989), Austria’s Integrations Policy. In: Statens Industriverk, Svensk industri inför EG'92, 
Stockholm, SIND 2/1989: 25-34. 
Loeffler, Elke, Dominic Sobczak, Frankie Hine-Hughes (2012), Liberalisation and privatisation in the EU: Services 
of general interest and the roles of the public sector. European Commission and Multi-Science Publishing. 
OECD (2001), Economic Surveys: Austria. December. 
OECD (2005), Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Austria – 2004-2005. 
DAF/COMP(2005)32/02, 4 October. 





Seidel, Hans (2017), Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik in der Kreisky-Ära. Herausgegeben von Ewald 
Walterskirchen, Gunther Tichy, Nora Popp, Michael H. Böheim, Wien – Köln - Weimar (Böhlau-Verlag). ISBN 
978-3-205-20625-5 
Steiner, Faye (2001), Regulation, industry structure and performance in the electricity supply industry. OECD 
Economic Studies No. 32: 143-182. 
Strand, Ivar, Paula Ramada and Erik Canton (2011), Public procurement in Europe: Cost and effectiveness. 
European Commission, March. Annex: detailed methodology and data. 
Wolfmayr, Yvonne, K.S. Friesenbichler, Harald Oberhofer, Michael Pfaffermayr, I. Siedschlag, M. Di Ubaldo, 
M.T. Koecklin, W. Yan (2019), The Performance of the Single Market for Goods After 25 Years. European 
Commission, Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, July. 
